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Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human capital intensive industries? 
We present a model that may explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, 
we analyze the conditions for implementing peer dependent incentive regimes when agents 
possess indispensable human capital. We show that the larger the share of values that the 
agents can hold-up, the lower is the implementable degree of peer dependent incentives. In a 
setting with team effects — complementary tasks and peer pressure, respectively — we show 
that while team-based incentives are optimal if agents are dispensable, it may be costly, and in 
fact suboptimal, to provide team incentives once the agents become indispensable. 
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Firm value is increasingly dependent on human capital. The share of physical
capital in publicly traded corporations has dramatically decreased the last
30 years (see e.g. Blair and Kochan, 2000). At the same time we observe
a higher degree of individual performance pay in modern corporations (see
e.g. Brown et al., 1998; Brown and Heywood, 2002, and Lemieux et al.,
2007). Are these trends related? Several studies indicate so. Long and
Shields (2005), Lemieux et al. (2007) and Henneberger et al. (2007) ﬁnd
that individual performance pay is more likely to be found in ﬁrms with
highly educated employees. A recent study by Barth et al. (2006) shows
that the frequency of group-based incentives is decreasing for those with
higher education, and increasing for blue-collar workers; while individual
performance pay is found to be strongly associated with ﬁrms with a highly
educated workforce.1 Tremblay and Chenevert (2004) ﬁnd that high-tech
ﬁrms are more likely to use individual performance pay, but not group pay,
and Grund and Sliwka (2007) ﬁnd that individual performance appraisal,
such as performance pay, is more common at higher levels of organizations.
These studies are supported by research showing that the returns to skills
are increasing (see e.g. Junk et al. 1993). Human capital is to a larger extent
paid its marginal product, and individual performance pay is a way to that
(Lemieux et al. 2007). Group-based incentive schemes (as in partnerships),
are still quite common in certain high-skilled professional service industries
such as law, accounting, investment banking and consulting, but researchers
have noted that there is a trend away from equal sharing partnerships towards
productivity-based ”eat what you kill” partnerships (Levin and Tadelis, 2005)
One explanation for the increased use of individual performance pay is
that advances in information and communication technology has made it
easier to measure individual performance (Lemieux et al. 2007). A question
then is whether it is has become relatively more easy to asses the perfor-
mance of high-skilled workers. There is apparently no evidence that this is
the case, in fact, MacLeod and Parent (1999) ﬁnd that incomplete incen-
tive contracts based on looser performance assessments are more common
among highly educated. Barth et al. (2006) suggest that one should expect a
positive relationship between human capital and individual performance pay
because the quality and eﬀort of high-skilled workers have larger impacts on
productivity than the quality and eﬀort of other groups of workers. They
1In addition, several studies show that ﬁrms with low union coverage are more willing
to use individualized incentive schemes (see e.g. Brown, 1990; Parent, 2002, Long and
Shields, 2005, Lemieux et al.), and union coverage is lower among high-skilled workers
(Acemoglu et al. 2001).
2lend support from Brown (1990) who argues that in high-skilled jobs, worker
output is more sensitive to worker quality than in jobs requiring lower skills.
Henneberger et al. (2007) show that high-skilled workers tend to self-select
into jobs with performance pay, supporting Lazear’s (1986) model. Along the
same line, studies by Kato (2002) and Torrington (1993) show that workers
with more education are particularly interested in receiving rewards tailored
to individual performance.
In our view, these are plausible explanations. However, there are some re-
maining puzzles. Individualized incentives are not desirable when teamwork
is important, or when it is diﬃcult to verify each worker’s contribution to
ﬁrm value, but it is hard to see that this applies less to high-skilled than to
low-skilled workers. In fact, several HR scholars have argued that knowledge
intensive organizations’ emphasis on innovation, teamwork and projects calls
for incentives that are group-based rather than based on individual perfor-
mance (see e.g. Balkin and Bannister, 1993). We should thus look for an
explanation saying that group-based incentives are desirable, but not feasi-
ble. Focusing on ﬁrms’ inability to fully commit to incentive contracts, the
literature has pointed out that group-based incentive schemes are harder to
implement — and thus less feasible — than scemes based on relative perfor-
mance evaluation (Carmichael, 1983; Malcomson, 1984; Levin, 2002, Kvaløy
and Olsen 2006). In this paper we focus instead on the workers’ lack of abil-
ity to commit to incentive contracts, which we believe is a central feature of
human capital intensive ﬁrms, and show that this feature makes individual
performance pay easier to implement than most peer-dependent schemes.
We recognize here two features of human capital that necessitate a high
degree of individual performance pay. First, the true performance of high-
skilled workers is often diﬃcult to verify by third parties. Objective measures
of performance seldom exist, and even if they do, looser assessments of per-
formance also aﬀect compensation (see e.g. MacLeod, 2003). Consequently,
incentive contracts specifying criteria for performance pay are seldom fully
protected by the court. This non-veriﬁability problem also applies to low-
skilled workers, but as noted above, incomplete incentive contracts are more
common in the high-skilled workforce. Second, human capital blurs the al-
location of ownership rights. According to the standard view of ownership,
it is the owner of an asset who has residual control rights; that is “the right
to decide all usages of the asset in any way not inconsistent with a prior
contract, custom or law” (Hart, 1995). If the asset involved in the worker’s
production is his own mind and knowledge, then he is also to decide all
non-contractual usages. An indispensable ”knowledge worker” can therefore
3threaten to walk away with ideas, clients, techniques etcetera.2 As noted by
Liebeskind (2000), human-capital-intensive ﬁrms must induce their employ-
ees to stay around long enough so that the ﬁrm can establish some intellectual
property rights with respect to the ideas generated by these employees, or
else these ﬁrms run the risk of being expropriated or held-up by their own
employees.3
Why do these two features - incomplete contracts and indispensable hu-
man capital - prepare the way for individual performance pay? In other
words: Why is it diﬃcult to implement peer-dependent incentives when per-
formance is unveriﬁable and workers possess residual control rights? The
answer is intuitive when we think of the incentives facing an agent who is a
full residual claimant. He simply gets the values he has produced; the market
incentives are not linked to what other agents produce. Hence, if a principal
wants to implement a peer-dependent incentive contract, she faces a problem
if her agents have residual control rights. With relative performance evalua-
tion (RPE) an agent is not paid well if his peer performs better, while with
joint performance evaluation (JPE) he is not paid well if his peer’s perfor-
mance is poor. This peer-dependence may lead to contract breach: an agent
who is paid a low bonus after realizing a high output, has incentives to hold-
up his output and renegotiate payments. Of course, a hold-up strategy is
only possible if the agent actually is able to prevent the principal from real-
izing the agent’s value added ex post production. But if hold-up is possible,
then RPE and JPE schemes are more susceptible to hold-up than incentive
schemes based on independent performance evaluation (IPE).
The parties can mitigate the hold-up problem through repeated interac-
tion, i.e. through self-enforcing relational contracting4 (also called implicit
contracting) where contract breach is punished, not by the court, but by the
parties who can refuse to cooperate after a deviation. But since a hold-up will
2A curious example is from Academia, where researchers can threaten to "walk away"
with their forthcoming publications. This is particularly relevant in countries where the
universities’ funding partly depends on publications.
3It should be noted that indispensability is often achieved through investments in ﬁrm-
speciﬁc human capital. Hence, a worker who possesses indispensable human capital is not
necessarily highly educated, and education does not guarantee indispensability. However,
speciﬁc human capital is strongly associated with high levels of formal education (see
Blundell et al., 1999).
4Inﬂuential models of relatonal contracts include Klein and Leﬄer (1981), Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), Bull (1987), Kreps (1990), Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994, 2002),
Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995). MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) generalize the case of
symmetric information, while Levin (2003) makes a general treatment of relational con-
tracts with asymmetric information, allowing for incentive problems due to moral hazard
and hidden information.
4be regarded as a deviation from such a relational contract, the self-enforcing
range of the contract is limited by the hold-up problem. And since the hold-
up problem is most severe under joint or relative performance evaluation, we
can expect a larger fraction of independent performance pay when hold-up
is feasible for the agents.
Is this a problem? Yes, from the informativeness principle (Holmström,
1979, 1982), we know that an incentive contract should be based on all vari-
ables that provide information about the agents’ actions. Stochastic and/or
technological dependences between the agents then typically call for peer-
dependent incentive schemes. By tying compensation to an agent’s relative
performance, the principal can ﬁlter out common noise so that compensation
is based more on real eﬀort, and less on random shocks that are outside the
agent’s control (see Holmström, 1982; and Mookherjee, 1984).5 And by tying
compensation to the joint performance of a team of agents, the principal can
exploit complementarities between the agents’ eﬀorts.6
Hence, from the informativeness principle it is puzzling that we actu-
ally observe incentive schemes based on independent performance evaluation.
The drawbacks of JPE and RPE can partly explain it: JPE may be suscepti-
ble to free-riding (see e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; and Holmström, 1982),
while RPE is susceptible to collusion (see e.g. Mookherjee, 1984). RPE may
also induce sabotage and discourage cooperation (see Lazear, 1995, for a
discussion of the costs and beneﬁts of RPE and JPE).
In this paper we provide a new rationale for independent performance
evaluation; a rationale that is not based on these classical drawbacks, but
rather on the implementability of peer-dependent incentives. Our main result
then says that the maximum dependence between agent i’s bonus and agent
j’s output that the principal can implement, decreases with the share of
values that the agents can hold-up ex post. This result is robust to settings
with both stochastic and technological dependence (team eﬀects) between
the agents.
With respect to team eﬀects we consider two cases: complementary tasks
and peer pressure. We show that a stark JPE contract is optimal only if
the agents’ hold-up power is suﬃciently low. In the case of complementary
5See also Lazear and Rosen (1981) Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983) and Green and Stokey
(1983) for analyses of RPE’s special form, rank-order tournaments.
6In addition, JPE can promote cooperation since an agent is rewarded if his peers
perform well (see e.g. Holmström and Milgrom, 1990; Itoh 1993; and Macho-Stadler and
Perez-Castrillo, 1993). JPE can also provide implicit incentives not to shirk (or exert low
eﬀort), since shirking may have social costs (as in Kandel and Lazear, 1992), or induce
other agents to shirk, which again reduces the shirking agent’s expected compensation (as
in Che and Yoo, 2001).
5tasks, the optimal implementable scheme becomes less based on JPE and
more based on IPE the larger the share of values the agents can hold-up, and
in the case of peer pressure, any JPE scheme becomes suboptimal once the
relational contract constraints bind.
Broadly speaking, our contribution is to consider the eﬀect of residual
control rights in a multiagent moral hazard model. In the vast literature on
multiagent moral hazard it is (implicitly) assumed that residual control rights
a r ee x c l u s i v e l yi nt h eh a n d so ft h ep r i n c i p a l . A n di nt h el i t e r a t u r ed e a l i n g
with optimal allocation of control rights, the multiagent moral hazard prob-
lem is scantily considered. 7 Our paper also contributes to the literature by
introducing other-regarding preferences and team technology in a relational
contracting set-up.
Our basic set-up with two agents, binary eﬀort and binary output is
similar to Che and Yoo (2001). As shown by these authors, peer monitor-
ing is a rationale for making use of peer-dependent incentives such as JPE.
We introduce and explore instead technological complementarities and peer
pressure in this setting. And more importantly, we extend and complement
their analysis by assuming non-veriﬁable output, and that agents are able to
hold-up values ex post.8
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. Section
3 deduces the optimal relational incentive contract in a simple setting with
stochastic and technological independence. In Section 4 we analyze the eﬀect
of complementary tasks, common noise and peer pressure, while Section 5
oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider an economic environment consisting of one principal and two iden-
tical agents (i =1 ,2) who each period produce either high, QH,o rl o w ,QL,
values for the principal. Each agent’s eﬀort level can be either high or low,
where high eﬀort has a disutility cost of c and low eﬀort is costless. The
7This literature begins with Grossman and Hart, 1986; and Hart and More,1990 who
analyze static relationships. Repeated relationships are analyzed in particular by Halonen,
2002; and Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002.
Although Hart and Moore (1990) analyze a model with many agents, they do not con-
sider the classical moral hazard problem that we address, where a principal can only
observe a noisy measure of the agents’ eﬀort.
8Kvaløy and Olsen (2006) analyze a multilateral relational contract with repeated peer-
monitoring. But team technology, peer pressure and agent hold-up is not considered in
that model. Kvaløy and Olsen (2007) endogenize the agent’s hold-up power in a simpler
model with no team eﬀects.
6principal can only observe the realization of the agents’ output, not the level
of eﬀort they choose. Similarly, agent i can only observe agent j’s output
(i 6= j, j =1 ,2),n o th i se ﬀort level.9 Moreover, we assume that output
is non-veriﬁable to a third party. Hence, contracts on output cannot be
enforced by the court.
The agents’ outputs depend on eﬀorts and noise. Like Che and Yoo
(2001), we assume that a favorable shock occurs with probability σ ∈ (0,1),i n
which case both agents succeed in producing high values for the principal. If
the shock is unfavorable, the agents’ outputs are stochastically independent,
and each agent’s success probability depends on the agent’s own as well as
h i sp e e r ’ se ﬀort. Let q(κ,λ) denote this probability, where κ ∈ {H,L} and
λ ∈ {H,L} refer to the agent’s own and his peer’s eﬀort, respectively. We
assume that there are three levels of the success probability for each agent:
q(H,H)=qH (1)
q(H,L)=qHL
q(L,H)=q(L,L)=qL,w h e r e qL ≤ qHL ≤ qH, qL <q H.
T h ei d e ah e r ei st h a tt h ep e e r ’ se ﬀort has a positive eﬀect when the agent’s
own eﬀort is high, but has no eﬀect when own eﬀort is low. Note also that
qHL = qH corresponds to no team eﬀects (independent technology), while
qHL = qL corresponds to perfect complementarity.
Throughout the paper we assume that the value of high eﬀort exceeds its
cost, in the sense that
(1 − σ)∆q∆Q>c ,( 2 )
where ∆q = qH − qL and ∆Q = QH − QL. It is moreover assumed that all
parties are risk neutral, but that the agents are subject to limited liability:
the principal cannot impose negative wages.10 Ex ante reservation wages
are assumed to be zero, for convenience.
The principal may oﬀer each agent a wage contract saying that agent









LL) ex post value realizations,
where the subscripts refer to agent i and agent j’s realizations of Qk and
Ql, (k,l = H,L), respectively. (We sometimes suppress agent notation in
superscripts since the agents are identical.) For each agent, a wage scheme
exhibits joint (JPE), relative (RPE) or independent (IPE) performance evalu-
9Whether or not the agents can observe each others eﬀort level is not decisive for the
analysis presented. However, by assuming that eﬀort is unobservable among the agents,
we do not need to model repeated peer-monitoring.
10Limited liability may arise from liquidity constraints or from laws that prohibit ﬁrms
from extracting payments from workers.
7ation if, respectively, (βHH,βLH) > (βHL,βLL)11, (βHH,βLH) < (βHL,βLL),
and (βHH,βLH)=( βHL,βLL). With JPE an agent is paid more if his peer
does well, in RPE he is paid more if his peer does poorly, and in IPE his
payment is independent of his peer’s performance. Since outputs are not ver-
iﬁable, a contract must be self-enforcing to be sustainable. We now describe
the contracting environment in more detail.
Each period the principal and the agents face the following contracting
situation.










LL) conditional on outputs as described above.
2. The agents simultaneously choose eﬀorts. Provided the contract is




HH +( 1− σ){q(κ,λ)q(λ,κ)β
i





LH +( 1− q(κ,λ))(1 − q(λ,κ))β
i
LL}(3)
where κ and λ denote, respectively, agent i’s and agent j’s eﬀorts, κ,λ ∈
{H,L}.
3. The agents’ value realizations, Qk and Ql, (k,l = H,L), are revealed.
The principal decides whether or not to honor the contract.
4. If the principal reneges on the contract by refusing to pay β
i,s h e
bargains with the agent and pays a spot price si for the good. If the principal
honors the contract, the agent chooses whether or not to accept the payment
β
i. If he accepts, trade takes place according to the contract. If not, he
bargains with the principal and obtains a spot price si.
We assume that the spot price is determined by Nash bargaining. In stage
4a g e n ti is able to independently attain θQk, θ ∈ [0,1] in an alternative
market. In Nash bargaining, agent i will then receive θQk plus a share γ
of the surplus from trade i.e. si = sk = θQk + γ(Qk − θQk)=ηQk where
η = γ + θ(1 − γ). The agent’s total hold-up power (η)i st h e na ni n c r e a s i n g
function of ex post bargaining power, γ, and ex post outside options, θ.T h e
outside option parameter θ depends on the speciﬁcity of the agent’s value-
added. The more ﬁrm speciﬁc value-added — or the more narrow the agent’s
skill set — the lower is θ. But, importantly, note that even if θ =0 ,t h ea g e n t
can still achieve a share η = γ ex post. This share γ of the surplus from trade
is determined by ex post bargaining power, and will typically increase with
the indispensability of the agents: If agents possess essential human capital
that makes them indispensable for ex post value extraction, then γ is high.
But if values accrue directly to the principal in the process of production,
11The inequality means weak inequality of each component and strict inequality for at
least one component.
8then the agents have no hold-up power: γ = θ =0 ,s ot h a tη =0 .S o t o
o b t a i nap o s i t i v es p o tp r i c e ,t h ea g e n t sm u s tb ea b l et oh o l du pv a l u e si n
stage 3.12
2.1 The spot contract
A spot contract is a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) of the contracting game
described above. In stage 4, agent i will renege if his promised bonus for the
given outputs is lower than the spot price (β
i
kl <s k), and honor otherwise.
In stage 3, the principal will renege if β
i
kl >s k, and honor otherwise. Hence,
at least one party will renege, unless β
i
kl = sk. The only payment that
can be implemented for agent i when he has output Qk is thus sk = ηQk.
Anticipating this, agent i will in stage 2 exert low eﬀort if the cost of high
eﬀort exceeds the higher expected spot price induced by this eﬀort, i.e. if
c>(1 − σ)η(q(H,λ) − q(L,λ))∆Q. Recalling our assumptions (1) we see
that low eﬀort is thus a strictly dominant strategy if
(1 − σ)η∆q∆Q<c (4)
where ∆q = qH − qL. Hence, we see that the spot contracting game has
a unique continuation equilibrium from stage 2 if (4) holds13.E a c h a g e n t
then exerts low eﬀort and receives the expected spot price E(s)=η(QL +
(σ +( 1− σ)qL)∆Q). If (4) does not hold, there is an equilibrium where
each agent exerts high eﬀort and receives the expected spot price E(s)=
η(QL +( σ +( 1− σ)qH)∆Q).
In our simple model, a contract to motivate high eﬀort is only necessary
if the parameters satisfy (4), since if not, the agents’ hold-up power provides
them with suﬃcient incentives. Hence, throughout the paper we assume that
(4) holds, so that the principal has to implement an incentive contract in
12It should be noted that the ability to hold-up values rests on the assumption that
agents become indispensable in the process of production (as in e.g. Halonen, 2002). We
do not analyze the incentives to invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital (as in e.g Kessler and
Lülfesmann, 2006). Rather, we just assume that agents become indispensable ex post, and
then focus on how this aﬀects the multiagent moral hazard problem. We thus follow the
relational contracting literature, and abstract from human capital accumulation.T h el e v e l
of θQi and ηQi is therefore assumed to be exogenously given and constant each period.
This also allows us to concentrate on stationary relational contracts, where the principal
promises the same contingent compensation in each period.
13If there are team eﬀects, low eﬀort by both agents is a continuation equilibrium in
stage 2 if the weaker condition (1 − σ)η(qHL − qL)∆Q<cholds. In that case, if (1 −
σ)η(qHL − qL)∆Q<c≤ (1 − σ)η(qH − qL)∆Q,t h e r ea r et w oe ﬀort equilibria, namely
HH and LL.
9order to induce high eﬀort. Since outputs are non-veriﬁable, such a contract
must be self-enforcing.
2.2 Relational contracts
For the principal to implement high eﬀort through a contract, β,t h ec o n t r a c t
must be incentive compatible (IC) and self-enforcing, where a self-enforcing
(relational) contract is a PPE of the inﬁnitely repeated game in which the
stage game described above is played every period. We consider ﬁrst the IC
constraint.
An implementable incentive scheme, β, is incentive compatible if
π(H,H,β) − c ≥ π(L,H,β) (5)
The left hand side (LHS) shows the expected wage minus the cost from
exerting high eﬀort, while the right hand side (RHS) shows the expected wage
from exerting low eﬀort. The condition (5) ensures that high eﬀort from both
agents is an equilibrium, given the contract β. The agents’ equilibrium is
unique if high eﬀort is a dominant strategy, i.e. if π(H,L,β)−c ≥ π(L,L,β)
holds in addition to (5). The optimal wage schemes we deduce in this paper
will ensure either a unique high-eﬀort equlibrium, or a high-eﬀort equlibrium
that is not Pareto dominated by a low-eﬀort equilibrium.
Consider now the conditions for the incentive contract to be self-enforcing,
i.e. the conditions for implementing a relational incentive contract.T h e
relational incentive contract is self-enforcing if all parties honor the contract
for all possible values of Qk and Ql, k,l ∈ {L,H}.A s i n e . g .B a k e r ,
Gibbons and Murphy (2002), we analyze trigger strategy equilibria in which
the parties enter into spot contracting forever after one party reneges. We
consider a multilateral punishment structure where any deviation by the
principal triggers low eﬀort from both agents. The principal honors the
contract only if both agents honored the contract in the previous period.
The agents honor the contract only if the principal honored the contract
with both agents in the previous period. Thus, if the principal reneges on
the relational contract, both agents insist on spot contracting forever after.
And vice versa: if one of the agents (or both) renege, the principal insists
on spot contracting forever after. A natural explanation for this is that the
agents interpret a unilateral contract breach (i.e. the principal deviates from
the contract with only one of the agents) as evidence that the principal is
not trustworthy (see Bewley, 1999, and Levin, 2002).14
14Modelling multilateral punishments is also done for convenience. Bilateral punish-
ments will not alter our results qualitatively.
10Now, (given that (5) holds) the principal will honor the contract if, for
all realizations of output Qk,Q l, k,l ∈ {H,L}, we have
−βkl − βlk +
2δ
1 − δ
[QL +( σ +( 1− σ)qH)∆Q − π(H,H,β)] (EP)
≥− η(Ql + Qk)+
2δ
1 − δ
[QL +( σ +( 1− σ)qL)∆Q − E(s)],
where δ is a common discount factor. The LHS of the inequality shows the
principal’s expected present value from honoring the contract, which involves
paying out the promised bonuses and then receiving the value associated with
high eﬀort in all future periods. The RHS shows the expected present value
from reneging, which involves spot trading of the realized outputs, and then
receiving the value associated with low eﬀort and spot trading in all future
periods.







E(s), all k,l ∈ {H,L} (EA)
where similarly the LHS shows the agent’s expected present value from
honoring the contract, while the RHS shows the expected present value from
reneging.
3 Independent tasks
In order to highlight the main result from the model in the simplest possible
setting, we ﬁrst consider the case of stochastic and technological indepen-
dence, i.e. σ =0and qHL = qH. The more general set-up is analyzed in the
next section.
In this setting the IC condition (5) for high eﬀort from each agent takes
the following form:




The optimal contract minimizes the associated expected wage costs π(H,H,β),
subject to the constraints given by limited liability, incentive compatibility
(IC), and enforceability (EP and EA). By IC and the deﬁnition (3) of the
wage cost, we have for π = π(H,H,β):




+ qHβLH +( 1− qH)βLL.
11From this inequality and limited liability (βLH,βLL ≥ 0), we see that the
least cost contract satisfying IC has βLH = βLL =0and yields a per agent
wage cost πm = qH
c
∆q. Such a contract would always be feasible, and hence
optimal, if outputs were veriﬁable.
Such a contract will also satisfy the agent’s enforceability conditions EA
when the hold-up parameter η is small, but generally not so when η is ’large’.
(The RHS of EA is increasing in η.) Inserting for EA (applied to βLH and







[E(s) − π + c]
Collecting terms involving π and substituting for the expected spot price








Since IC and limited liability (βLH,βLL ≥ 0) implies π ≥ qH
c
∆q, we see




+m a x {0,ηQL − δ(
c
∆q
− η∆Q)qL} = πmin (8)
The last term in πmin reﬂects the inﬂuence of the enforceability conditions
(EA) for the agent. (We will check the corresponding conditions for the
principal (EP) below). When the last term in πmin is positive, it is impossible
to implement and enforce a relational contract where the agent is paid βLH =
βLL =0f o ral o wo u t c o m e ,a n dt h ew a g ec o s tf o rt h ep r i n c i p a lw i l lt h e r e f o r e
exceed the cost for the case η =0 . Higher wages ease implementation by
making it less tempting for the agents to renege on the contract.
The additional cost is increasing in η, the share of the value that the
agent can hold-up ex post. The cost is naturally decreasing in δ,s i n c eh i g h e r
discount factors ease implementation. We will here restrict attention to cases
where the hold-up problem is serious in the sense that the cost is positive for
all δ < 1. This will be the case when the hold-up parameter η is suﬃciently
large, more precisely when it satisﬁes15






The derivation of the lower bound πmin above shows that in order to
minimize the additional cost associated with the self-enforcement constraint,
15Note that η0∆q∆Q<c , so (4) is not violated, given that σ =0here.
12EA, the principal must set βLH = βLL, i.e. ensure that an agent’s pay for low
output is independent of the other agent’s output. The ’ﬁxed wage’ associated
with these outcomes (βLH = βLL) generates the additional cost term in the
expression for πmin,a n dh e n c ew eh a v e( f o rη > η0):
βLH = βLL = ηQL − δ(
c
∆q
− η∆Q)qL > 0 (10)
Since the enforceability constraint (EA) is binding for these two bonuses,
i tf o l l o w st h a tw ec a nw r i t et h i sc o n s t r a i n tf o rt h eo t h e rb o n u s e si nt h e
following form:
βHl − η∆Q ≥ βLH = βLL, l = H,L (EA’)
This relation says that the bonus increments for high output βHH − βLH
and βHL−βLL must both exceed η∆Q, which is the additional value of high
o u t p u tf o rt h ea g e n to u t s i d et h er e l a t i o n s h i p .A tt h es a m et i m et h eb o n u s e s
must be incentive compatible with high eﬀort, and to minimize costs they
must satisfy IC with equality, which is to say that we must have




Note that an IPE scheme with βHl − βLl = c
∆q will certainly fulﬁll both
constraints EA’ and IC’, given that we have assumed c
∆q > η∆Q, see (4).
The constraints imply that to generate minimal costs and be implementable a
scheme cannot deviate too much from IPE. Figure 1 provides an illustration.
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13The ﬁgure depicts the IC constraint and the reduced form dynamic en-
forceability constraints for the agents (EA’) as functions of the bonus incre-
ments βHL−βLL and βHH−βLH (where βLH = βLL). Here points above, on
and below the diagonal represent, respectively, JPE, IPE and RPE contracts.
The ﬁgure illustrates that only a limited set of contracts on IC satisﬁes the
agents’ enforceability constraints.
To be fully feasible a contract must also satisfy the dynamic enforceability
constraint for the principal (EP). As we demonstrate in the appendix, this
constraint can here be written as





This reduced form EP constraint can be represented as the curve marked
E P ’i nF i g u r e1 .T h ec u r v eh a sak i n ka tβHH−βLH = 1
2(βHL−βLL+η∆Q),
and its position depends on δ. For given bonuses, the constraint requires that
the discount factor δ must be suﬃciently large to guarantee implementability.
Conversely, for given δ the constraint limits the set of bonuses that can be
implemented; in particular we see that the bonus increments βHl−βLl cannot
be too large.






∆q(2 − qH) (11)
we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 (i) For η ≥ η0 and δ ≥ b δ a wage scheme satisfying (10), IC’,
EA’ and EP’ is optimal. The minimal wage cost is given by πmin,a n da n y
other implementable wage scheme yields a higher cost. (ii) No wage scheme
yielding high eﬀort can be implemented for δ < b δ
Remark. In the appendix we verify that the optimal wage schemes
ensure either a unique high-eﬀort equlibrium (for RPE schemes), or a high-
eﬀort equlibrium that is not Pareto dominated by a low-eﬀort equilibrium
(for JPE or IPE schemes). Moreover, we show that these schemes satisfy the
following conditions
π(H,H,β) − c ≥ E(s) (12)
∆q∆Q ≥ π(H,H,β) − E(s) (13)
The ﬁrst shows that the agents’ expected payment from the incentive
contract exceeds the expected spot price, and the second shows that the
14principal’s expected surplus from the contract exceeds the surplus from spot
contracting. All parties are therefore better oﬀ with the relational contract
than with a spot contract.
Proposition 1 shows that an optimal wage scheme satisﬁes IC and is
bounded by the dynamic implementability constraints EA’ and EP’. Consider
now variations in η.A s η increases (for δ ﬁxed), the curve representing
EA’ in Figure 1 moves outwards along the 45 degree line with the EP’-curve
’attached to it’. The IC curve remains ﬁxed, and thus a smaller set of bonuses
remains admissible. Hence, the agents’ ability to hold-up values ex post
calls for incentive schemes that come close to schemes based on independent
performance evaluation. We have:
Proposition 2 The maximum dependence between agent i’s bonus and agent
j’s output that the principal can implement, decreases with the share of values,
η, that the agents can hold-up. In particular, for an optimal and feasible
wage scheme, we have βLH = βLL and |βHH − βHL| ≤ ( c
∆q −η∆Q)m,w h e r e
m =m a x { 1
qH, 1
1−qH}
Note that for a suﬃciently large η only IPE remains feasible, since |βHH − βHL| →
0 as η → c
∆q∆Q. Finally note also that a higher η eases implementation of
high eﬀort. This is seen in the expression for the critical factor b δ,w h i c h
shows that b δ → 0 as η → c
∆q∆Q.
Proposition 2 highlights how agent hold-up aﬀects the implementability
of peer dependent incentives. An agent who realizes a high output, but is
paid a low bonus only because his peer performs better (RPE) or worse
(JPE), has incentives to hold-up his output and renegotiate payments. This
obstructs the implementation of relational incentive contracts.
In the simple setting presented in this section, there is no inherent reason
for the principal to oﬀer peer-dependent incentives, since IPE, RPE and JPE
are equally proﬁtable. However, once we allow for technological or stochastic
dependence between the agents’ tasks, RPE or JPE become desirable. But
as we shall see in the next section, even if peer-dependent incentives become
desirable, the basic insight from Proposition 2 remains valid, and implies
that the most desirable schemes may well not be implementable.
4 Team incentives
We will now demonstrate the importance of agent-hold up in a setting where
there are team eﬀects. Such eﬀects can take many forms; here we analyze
two cases: Complementary tasks and peer pressure.
154.1 Complementary tasks
Consider now the general formulations (1) - (3) incorporating complementary
tasks and common noise. For expositional simplicity we will assume perfect
complementarity, so that high eﬀo r tf r o mo n ea g e n ti sp r o d u c t i v eo n l yi ft h e
other agent also exerts high eﬀort, and thus
q(H,H)=qH >q L = q(H,L)=q(L,H)=q(L,L)
In this setting we have:




HβHH + qH(1 − qH)(βHL + βLH)+( 1− qH)
2βLL
ª




LβHH + qL(1 − qL)(βHL + βLH)+( 1− qL)
2βLL
ª
To illustrate the forces at play here, consider ﬁrst three ’extreme’ con-
tracts; a stark JPE scheme (βHH,0,0,0),ap u r eI P Es c h e m e(β,β,0,0) and
as t a r kR P Es c h e m e(0,βHL,0,0). In all contracts an agent is paid a bonus
only if he has a success. The JPE (RPE) contract pays the bonus when the
success occurs together with a success (failure) by the other agent, while in
the IPE contract the payment is independent of the other agent’s outcome.
We will now show that if we ignore enforceability conditions, the least cost
contract is either the stark JPE scheme or the stark RPE scheme. We will
then show that (i) while these contracts can be feasible (enforceable) when
the agents’ hold-up power is suﬃciently small, they become unfeasible when
this hold-up power exceeds some threshold, and (ii) that the optimal contract
then moves towards an IPE scheme as the hold-up power increases beyond
the threshold.
For the JPE scheme (βHH,0,0,0), the IC constraint π(H,H,β) − c ≥
π(L,H,β) yields (1 − σ)(q2
H − q2
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while for the RPE scheme the IC constraint yields (1 − σ)(qH − qL)(1 −
qH − qL)βHL ≥ c and thus expected costs πR = qH(1 − qH) c
(qH−qL)(1−qH−qL)
(assuming 1 −qH − qL > 0). The RPE contract here ﬁlters out the common
noise factor, and yields a cost that is completely independent of this factor.
Comparing the three contracts, we see that for σ =0the JPE contract
yields the lowest cost, and that we then have πJ < πI < πR.F o r σ close
to 1, on the other hand, the RPE contract yields the lowest cost. Indeed,
(assuming 1 − qH − qL > 0) there is critical ˆ σ ∈ (0,1) such that for σ < ˆ σ
we have πJ < πI < πR, while for σ > ˆ σ we have πJ > πI > πR.T h e
critical ˆ σ is given by the condition πJ = πR, which after a little algebra
yields ˆ σ =
qHqL
(1−qH)(1−qL).
16The reason behind these results are as follows: When tasks are comple-
ments, low eﬀort from agent i yields a negative externality on agent j.W i t h
JPE, the agent is punished for this, i.e. JPE internalizes the externality to
some extent. If there is no or little common noise (σ < ˆ σ), this makes it less
costly to implement high eﬀort under JPE than under IPE or RPE. Indeed,
the stark JPE scheme will then, if it is feasible, dominate all other schemes.
B u tt h eJ P Es c h e m e ,w h i c hp a y so u tb o n u s e sw h e nb o t ha g e n t sh a v eh i g h
outputs, is vulnerable to common shocks. So when the common noise factor
is suﬃciently large (σ > ˆ σ)t h i ss c h e m ei sd o m i n a t e db yt h eR P Es c h e m e ,
which here is immune to such shocks. Thus we see that there is a tension
here between (i) using JPE to internalize the externality induced by the com-
plementarity between tasks, and (ii) using RPE to ﬁlter out and neutralize
the eﬀect of the common shocks.
This can be illustrated by Figure 2, which is similar to Figure 1. (The
position of the IC constraint will be diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a ti nF i g u r e1d u et o
the complementarity and noise factors.) The three contracts discussed above
are here represented by points J, I, and R, respectively. The dotted lines are
iso-cost lines for the principal. Their slope depend on σ, and the critical value
ˆ σ is precisely the value for which they are parallel to the IC line. For σ < ˆ σ
the iso-cost lines are steeper than the IC line, as indicated in the ﬁgure. It
is clear from the ﬁgure that the JPE contract then yields a lower cost than
the two other contracts. It is also clear that for the opposite case σ > ˆ σ
the lowest cost will be obtained by the RPE contract, since the iso-cost lines
then are less steep than the IC line.
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Regarding enforceability, we see by checking the EA constraints that the
17three contracts do satisfy these constraints if the agents have no hold-up
power (since the RHS of EA is zero for η =0 ). Checking the EP constraints,
we see that the three contracts also satisfy these for η =0 ,p r o v i d e dt h e
discount factor δ is suﬃciently close to 1. T h i si m p l i e st h a te a c ho ft h e s e
contracts is enforceable if the agents’ hold-up power is suﬃciently small (η
close to zero), and δ is suﬃciently close to 1. Intuitively, each contract gives
both agents a rent (πi−c>0), and for η small no agent can gain by reneging.
Also, each contract gives the principal a surplus exceeding her spot surplus
for η small (one can check that (1 − σ)∆q∆Q − πi > 0), and hence neither
the principal has incentives to renege when future surpluses are suﬃciently
important for her (δ is large).
The stark JPE or RPE contracts discussed above will, however, typically
not be feasible when the agents’ hold-up power (η) is ’large’, since they will
then typically violate the agents’ enforceability constraints (EA). As we will
show below, these constraints can be represented by lines such as EA’ in
Figure 2. This is similar to the independence case illustrated in Figure 1,
and we will see that the principal’s constraints (EP) can be represented in a
similar way as well. The unique optimal contract for the case illustrated in
Figure 2 (σ < ˆ σ) will then be the contract given by the north-west intersec-
tion point of IC and EA’. This is a JPE contract, but it is less stark than the
JPE contract discussed above. As η increases, the principal will be forced to
move the contract in the direction of the 45 degree line, and hence move it
towards an IPE contract.
Proceeding to the formal analysis, note that the IC constraint π(H,H,β)−
c ≥ π(L,H,β), can here be written:




where ∆q = qH −qL.C o n s i d e rﬁrst the case σ < ˆ σ =
qHqL
(1−qH)(1−qL). Substitut-
ing for βHH from the IC constraint (ICt) into the expression for π(H,H,β)
we obtain the following inequality (see the appendix)
π ≥ πJ +
p
2
(βHL + βLH)+( 1− p)βLL,( 1 4 )
where
πJ =








qHqL − σ(1 − qH)(1 − qL)
qH + qL
∈ (0,q H)
We recognize πJ as the cost associated with the stark JPE contract discussed
above. The inequality in (14) shows that this is the lowest cost to implement
18high eﬀort, subject to limited liability. But for η > 0 the bonuses must also
satisfy the enforceability conditions. Using EA for βHL,βLH,βLL in (14) now
yields (see the appendix):
π ≥ πJ +
p
2








σ +( 1− σ)q2
L
qH + qL
As in Section 3, we will also here restrict attention to cases where the hold-up
problem is serious in the sense that πm(η,δ) > πJ for all δ < 1. This will
occur when the hold-up parameter η exceeds some threshold. Deﬁne η1 as
the smallest value of η that makes the expression for β(η,δ) positive for all








Reasoning as in the previous section we then obtain the following result (see
the appendix):
Lemma 1 For σ < ˆ σ =
qHqL
(1−qH)(1−qL) we have: For η ≥ η1 the minimal wage
cost subject to IC and EA is given by πm(η,δ). This is attained when IC
binds, and when EA binds for βHL,βLH,βLL. The unique bonuses are given
by






− η∆Q) > βHL = βLL + η∆Q,
βLH = βLL = β(η,δ) (16)
Remark. In the appendix we show that the optimal wage scheme given
in the lemma ensures a high-eﬀort equlibrium that is not Pareto dominated
by a low-eﬀort equilibrium.
The given wage scheme is JPE, but has a less stark form than the optimal
scheme for veriﬁable output. And we see that the larger is the agent’s ex
post share η, the closer the scheme is to an IPE scheme; speciﬁcally we see
that βHH − βHL → 0 as η → c
(1−σ)∆q∆Q. Note moreover that, since EA is
16η > η1 is suﬃcient, but not strictly necessary for πm(η,δ) > πJ. We restrict attention
to η > η1 to simplify the exposition.
19binding for βLH and βLL,t h eE Ac o n s t r a i n t sf o rt h eo t h e rb o n u s e st a k et h e
form βHl − βLl ≥ η∆Q, and these constraints can hence be represented as
indicated in Figure 2. For the same reason the EP constraints can also be
represented as indicated in that ﬁgure.
To be implementable, a wage scheme must also satisfy EP. We show in
the appendix that the scheme given in Lemma 3 satisﬁes this constraint for




[(1 − σ)∆q∆Q − c]
c/(1 − σ) − η∆q∆Q
(qH + qL)∆q
Note that δ2 is decreasing in η. Hence, we have the following result.
Proposition 3 For σ < ˆ σ we have: For η ≥ η1 and δ ≥ δ2 the JPE wage
scheme given by (16) is implementable and uniquely optimal. As the share
of values (η) that the agents can hold-up ex post increases, the scheme ap-
proaches an IPE scheme.
For given η ≥ η1 and for discount factors smaller than the critical fac-
tor δ2, the scheme (16) will no longer be implementable. For δ = δ2 the
dynamic enforceability constraint for the principal (EP) is binding for βHH
(and only for this bonus), while the agent’s constraint EA is binding for the
other bonuses. The least costly way for the principal to adapt to a lower δ
(and hence a stricter EP) will then be to reduce βHH, and by that reduce
the diﬀerence βHH − βHL. N o t ea sw e l lt h a tal o w e rδ will also increase
βLH,βLL,βHL when EA binds, see (16). Thus, a lower δ will force the princi-
pal to modify the scheme towards an IPE scheme. To sum up: the possibility
for the agents to hold-up values forces the principal to oﬀer a greater extent
of individualized incentives at the expense of team incentives, even when the
agents’ tasks are perfect complements
So far we have only analyzed the case of a ’small’ common shock; σ < ˆ σ.
The case σ > ˆ σ can be analyzed similarly. (Note that this case is only relevant
if qH+qL < 1,s i n c eo t h e r w i s eˆ σ ≥ 1.) The reasoning leading to Lemma 1 and
the discussion following Figure 2 indicates that for η exceeding some lower
bound the minimal cost contract will be a modiﬁed RPE contract, graphically
given by the south-east intersection of EA’ and IC in Figure 2. This can be
veriﬁed formally, and it can also be veriﬁed that this contract will satisfy EP
and hence be fully implementable when δ exceeds some critical value δ
0
2 < 1
(cfr Proposition 3). Moreover, as η increases the contract will move towards
an IPE contract.17 Formal proofs of these assertions are available from the
authors.
17In the case σ > ˆ σ considered here, it turns out that the least-cost contract is not
204.2 Peer pressure
A more striking demonstration of the JPE hold-up problem can be made in a
setting with peer pressure. In order to highlight the eﬀe c t so ft h i sf e a t u r e ,w e
return to the case of stochastic and technological independence, i.e. σ =0
and qHL = qH, as assumed in Section 3. To model peer pressure in this
framework, we assume that there are costs associated with lowering the peer’s
wage by realizing low output, i.e. that agents experience disutility from being
the ”weakest link”. Such an event will occur with probability (1 − qH)qH if
βHH > βHL. We represent this disutility by d =m a x {ν(βHH − βHL),0},
where ν is a cost parameter.
This assumption is in some sense in the spirit of Kandel and Lazear
(1992). They distinguish between internal peer pressure, or guilt, when eﬀort
is unobservable among the agents, and external pressure, or shame, when
eﬀort is observable. In our model, eﬀort is unobservable, so our assumption
can be interpreted as guilt. However, output is observable, so the weakest link
eﬀect can also be interpreted as shame. A point here is that our assumption
is not directly related to the disutility from low eﬀort. It is output that
matters. Low eﬀort gives no disutility if it leads to high output (which it
does with probability qL.) And high eﬀort may induce disutility if it leads
to low output. The shame interpretation is therefore most appropriate.
Let D denote the expected disutility associated with being the weakest
link:
D =( 1− qH)qHd =( 1− qH)qH max{ν(βHH − βHL),0}
In a high eﬀort equilibrium, each agent’s expected utility is now
π − D − c = qH [qHβHH +( 1− qH)βHL]
+(1 − qH)[qH(βLH − d)+( 1− qH)βLL] − c
where π = π(H,H,β). This yields an IC constraint just as (IC) in Section
3, except that βLH is replaced by βLH − d. From this constraint and the
deﬁnition of π we then obtain





+ qH(βLH − d)+( 1− qH)βLL
¸
+( 1− qH)[qHβLH +( 1− qH)βLL]
unique, as there is some leeway in specifying the bonuses βHL and βLH. The modiﬁed
RPE contract is one optimal contract, and any optimal contract moves towards an IPE
contract when η increases.






H max{ν(βHH − βHL),0} + qHβLH +( 1− qH)βLL (17)
Ignoring enforceability contraints for the moment, we now see that if
ν > 0, the least costly contract has βHL = βLH = βLL =0and βHH =
c
qH∆q(1+ν). (The latter value follows from the IC constraint, which for a
contract (βHH,0,0,0) here requires qHβHH −qH(−d) ≥ c
∆q.) The associated




ν+1. We see that this wage cost is decreasing
in v, and hence lower than the cost for the case ν =0 . This shows that, by
oﬀering incentives based on JPE, the principal can exploit the disutility eﬀect
of being the weakest link.




ν+1 is achievable if output is veriﬁable,
or if the enforceability contraints (EA and EP) do not bind.18 Interestingly,
we will now see that once the agent’s enforceability contraints bind for low
output (βLL and βLH), which will occur for η a b o v es o m et h r e s h o l d ,t h e nt h e
optimal scheme is not only a less stark JPE scheme; it is a pure IPE scheme.
In fact, any JPE contract is then dominated by this IPE scheme.
The dynamic enforceability constraint EA for the agents here takes the
form
min{βHH − ηQH,βHL − ηQH,βLH − d − ηQL,βLL − ηQL} ≥
δ
1 − δ
[E(s) − π + D + c]
Using (17), which follows from the present IC-constraint, and EA for











[E(s) − π + D + c]+qHd
¶
Note that −q2
Hd + qHd = D. Collecting terms involving π − D and











We see that to minimize π, the principal will want to set D as small as
possible i.e. make d =m a x {ν(βHH − βHL),0} as small as possible. This
means setting βHH−βHL =0 ,p r o v i d e dt h i si sf e a s i b l eb yE P .I tf o l l o w st h a t
18It can be checked that for η and ν suﬃciently small and for δ suﬃciently large this
least cost contract is implementable even if output is non-veriﬁable.
22the IPE wage scheme together with the feasible RPE schemes satisfying the
IC constraint with equality, are optimal once the enforceability conditions
EA bind for low outputs (bonuses βLH and βLL).






for all δ < 1, and so EA will indeed bind at outcomes LL and LH. Provided
βHH − βHL =0is feasible (EP is satisﬁed), then EA’ and IC’ will hold. EP
will be satisﬁed for this solution if EP’ holds for βHH = βHL,w h i c hi st h e
case if 2(βHH − βLH − η∆Q) ≤ 2δ
1−δ [∆q∆Q − c]. From EA’ and IC’ we see
that this holds if δ ≥ ¯ δ given by






For δ ≥ ¯ δ a nI P Ew a g es c h e m e( βHH = βHL)i st h u so p t i m a l . 19 We have the
following result:
Proposition 4 When there is peer pressure (ν > 0) and agent hold-up (η ≥
η0) we have: For δ ≥ ¯ δ an IPE wage scheme (with βHH = βHL) satisfying
(10), IC and EA’ is feasible and optimal. The minimal wage cost is πmin given
i n( 8 ) .A n yw a g es c h e m ew i t hβHH − βHL > 0 yields a strictly larger cost,
thus any JPE scheme is strictly inferior to IPE (and feasible RPE schemes).
The intuition for this result goes as follows: If the agents can renegotiate
a spot price, they are able to avoid the disutility eﬀects from peer pressure,
since a spot price is equivalent to an IPE scheme. In order to implement
JPE, the principal then has to compensate the agents for the peer pressure
eﬀect. But then JPE becomes more expensive than IPE or RPE, where no
such eﬀects exist. In other words: once the spot price becomes suﬃciently
tempting, the principal can no longer use JPE to exploit the eﬀects of peer
pressure, but has to compensate the agents for any disutility eﬀects that
team incentives provide.
5 Concluding remarks
In an interesting review of the history of employment relationships, Peter
Cappelli (2000) argues that the last twenty years have seen a dramatic shift
from traditional bureaucratic employment structures to ”inside contracting
19It can be seen that for suﬃciently low discount factors the ”commitment advantage”
of RPE dominates the peer-dependence eﬀect, making RPE optimal. The commitment
advantage of RPE (with no agent hold-up) is analyzed in Kvaløy and Olsen (2006).
23systems (...) shaped by individualized incentives and pressures from outside
labor markets. Along the same lines, Levin and Tadelis (2005) argue that
greater competition in the labour market and changes in market information
has made it less valuable to commit to the proﬁt sharing plans of professional
partnerships.
In this paper we oﬀer a model that elucidates these developments. We
h a v es h o w nt h a tc o m p e n s a t i o nt i e dt op eer performance can induce employee
hold-up and obstruct the implementation of relational incentive contracts.
The model presented may thus explain the tendency to use individual per-
formance pay in human-capital-intensive industries. Tremblay and Chenevert
(2004) and Appelbaum (1991) note that even if knowledge-based industries
are characterized by teamwork, the challenge to retain the most critical re-
sources increases the pertinence of rewarding individual performance. Our
model supports this conjecture.
In addition, the model can contribute to explain why relative performance
evaluation is used less in CEO compensation than agency theory suggests.20
Even though our model has a multilateral feature, i.e. one principal con-
tracting with two agents, what drives our result is the agents’ temptations
to renegotiate when not being paid according to absolute output. A CEO
interpretation is therefore not unreasonable since they are in the position
of holding up values ex post if not being paid a ”fair share” of their value
added.
There is a large literature discussing human capital and problems of
expropriation in modern corporations. Recent papers include Kessler and
Lülfesmann (2006) who show how the ﬁrm can balance incentive provision
between general and ﬁrm speciﬁc investments in human capital in order to
mitigate the hold-up problem; and Rajan and Zingales (2001) who argue
that human-capital-intensive industries will develop ﬂat organizations with
distinctive technologies and cultures in order to avoid expropriation. We
complement this literature by showing how indispensable human capital af-
fects the ﬁrm’s feasible incentive design.
Our model also complements the seminal paper by Holmström and Mil-
grom (1994). They show how asset ownership gives a ﬁrm the ability to
restructure the incentives of those who join the ﬁrm (the employees). In
particular, they show how a ﬁrm - by giving up control rights - loses the
ability to balance incentives between various tasks. We show how the ﬁrm -
by giving up control rights - loses the ability to exploit the advantages that
20See Murphy (1999) who states that ’the paucity of RPE in options and other compo-
nents of executive compensation remains a puzzle worth understanding’. See also Aggarwal
and Samwick (1999).
24lie in designing peer-dependent incentives.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider ﬁrst the principal’s enforceability constraint EP. The constraint
binds when βkl+βlk−η(Qk+Ql) is maximal. We can thus write the constraint
as




[∆q∆Q + E(s) − π(H,H,β)] (EP)
When the EA constraints are binding for βLH and βLL,w eh a v eβLH =
βLL = δ
1−δ [E(s) − π(H,H,β)+c]. Subtracting 2βLL − 2ηQL on both sides
then yields (recalling βLH = βLL):




We see that this is equivalent to the condition EP’ given in the text, because
the EA constraints for βHH and βHL a r eh e r ee q u i v a l e n tt oβHl−βLl−η∆Q ≥
0, l = H,L.
Consider now statement (i) in Proposition 1. It follows from the geometry
of Figure 1 that the minimal discount factor δ = b δ for which a bonus scheme
satisfying IC and EA’ also satisﬁes EP’ is obtained when the kink of the EP’
curve in Figure 1 is positioned on IC, i.e. when EP’, IC and 2(βHH −βLH −
η∆Q)=βHL − βLL − η∆Q hold jointly. The last two conditions yield
qH(βHH − βLH)+( 1− qH)(2(βHH − βLH) − η∆Q)=
c
∆q
and hence (2−qH)(βHH −βLH)= c
∆q +( 1−qH)η∆Q. Inserting this in EP’











This coincides with (11), and hence proves statement (i).
It remains to prove statement (ii). By deﬁnition of ˆ δ no wage scheme can
satisfy IC and EP’ for δ < ˆ δ. The statement then follows when we show that
EP’ is a necessary condition for implementability. To prove this, ﬁrst note
that EA implies
25βLj − ηQL ≥ δ
1−δ [E(s) − π + c], j = H,L, (π = π(H,H,β)).
Condition EP implies
2(βHH − βLH − η∆Q)+2 ( βLH − ηQL)=2 ( βHH − ηQH)
≤ 2δ
1−δ [∆q∆Q − π + E(s)]
and
(βHL − βLL − η∆Q)+( βLH − ηQL)+( βLL − ηQL)
=( βHL + βLH − ηQH − ηQL)
≤ 2δ
1−δ [∆q∆Q − π + E(s)]
Using these three inequalities we see that EP’ follows. This completes the
proof.
Remark Proposition 1
We here verify the statements made in the remark to Proposition 1. For
any contract β with βLH = βLL we have π(λ,κ,β)=qλ [qκβHH +( 1− qκ)βHL]+
(1 − qλ)βLL and hence
π(H,H,β) − π(H,L,β)+π(L,L,β) − π(L,H,β)
= qH ([qHβHH +( 1− qH)βHL] − [qLβHH +( 1− qL)βHL])
+qL ([qLβHH +( 1− qL)βHL] − [qHβHH +( 1− qH)βHL])
=( qH − qL)2 (βHH − βHL)
When IC binds (π(H,H,β) − c = π(L,H,β))w et h u sh a v e
π(L,L,β) − (π(H,L,β) − c)=( qH − qL)2 (βHH − βHL)
This is negative for RPE contracts, hence eﬀorts HH is then a unique equi-
librium for the given contract. The expression is however non-negative for
JPE or IPE contracts, hence eﬀorts LL is then another equilibrium.
Next compare equilibrium payoﬀs. Note that for βLH = βLL we have
π(L,L,β)−π(L,H,β)=qL ([qLβHH +( 1− qL)βHL] − [qHβHH +( 1− qH)βHL])
= −qL(qH − qL)(βHH − βHL)
Hence for a JPE or IPE contract with IC binding we have
π(L,L,β) ≤ π(L,H,β)=π(H,H,β) − c
with strict inequality for JPE. Thus the HH equilibrium yields a higher payoﬀ
than the LL equilibrium, and strictly so for a JPE contract.
Veriﬁcation of (12 - 13).
We verify here that (12 - 13) hold for the schemes stated in Proposition





∆q + ηQL − δ( c
∆q − η∆Q)qL
´
− η(QL + ∆QqL)
= qL
c
∆q + c − δ( c
∆q − η∆Q)qL − η∆QqL
=( 1− δ)( c
∆q − η∆Q)qL + c
This shows that π − E(s) >c , hence (12) holds. We further have




c−η∆Q∆q∆q(2 − qH)( c
∆q − η∆Q)qL
= ˆ δ[∆q∆Q − c](2− qH)qL < [∆q∆Q − c]
where the last inequality follows from ˆ δ < 1 and (2−qH)qL < (2−qH)qH < 1.
Hence we see that (13) holds.
Veriﬁcation of (14 - 15).
Substituting from βHH from (ICt) in the expression for π = π(H,H,β)
yields
π ≥










qH(1 − qH)(βHL + βLH)+( 1− qH)
2βLL
ª
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(1 − σ)qH(1 − qH) −
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Substituting then from EA for βHL,βLH,βLL in (14) we get








(E(s) − (π − c))
¶
Collecting terms involving π and substituting for E(s)=η(QL+(σ +( 1− σ)qL)∆Q)
then yields
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Proof of Lemma 1
Note ﬁrst that η1∆q∆Q(1 − σ) <cfor QL > 0, hence (4) is satisﬁed.
The derivation of (15) shows that for η ≥ η1 the minimal wage cost is given
by πm(η,δ), and that the minimum is attained when IC binds and EA binds
for βHL,βLH,βLL.
To verify the expression for βLL note that (14) may be written as π ≥
πJ +
p
2((βHL−βLL)+(βLH −βLL))+βLL. When EA binds for βHL,βLH,βLL
the RHS equals πm(η,δ), and we thus have πm(η,δ)=πJ+
p
2η∆Q+βLL.T h i s
yields the stated expression for βLL. Next, substituting for βLH = βLL =
βHL−η∆Q in (ICt) and solving this for βHH when the constraint binds then
yields the stated expression for βHH. To see this, note that the substitution
yields
[qH + qL]βHH+[1 − qH − qL](2βHL−η∆Q)−[2 − qH − qL](βHL−η∆Q)=
c
(1 − σ)∆q
Solving this for βHH yields the stated expression.
Remark to Lemma 1
We here verify the statements made in the remark to Lemma 1. From the
assumption of perfect complementarity we have now π(H,L,β)=π(L,L,β)=
π(L,H,β),a n df o rac o n t r a c tw i t hβLH = βLL we have then
∆π ≡ {π(H,H,β) − π(H,L,β)+π(L,L,β) − π(L,H,β)}/(1 − σ)
= qH [qHβHH +( 1− qH)βHL]+( 1− qH)βLL
−qL [qLβHH +( 1− qL)βHL] − (1 − qL)βLL
=( qH − qL)2 (βHH − βHL)+( qH − qL)(βHL − βLL)
The expression is positive for the JPE contract given in Lemma 1. When
IC binds (π(H,H,β) − c = π(L,H,β))w et h u sh a v e
π(L,L,β) − (π(H,L,β) − c)=∆π > 0,
hence eﬀorts LL is then another equilibrium.
28Comparing equilibrium payoﬀs, we have π(L,L,β)=π(L,H,β) by per-
fect complementarity and π(L,H,β)=π(H,H,β)−c when IC binds. Hence
π(L,L,β)=π(H,H,β)−c for the contract given in Lemma 1. The two eﬀort
equilibria thus yield equal payoﬀs. (We may note that with less than perfect
complementarity; qH >q HL >q L,w ew o u l dh a v eπ(L,L,β) < π(L,H,β)
and ∆π > 0 for the optimal JPE contract, and hence a strictly higher payoﬀ
for eﬀorts HH than for eﬀorts LL.)
Proof of Proposition 3
We must show that the bonuses given by (16) satisfy EP for δ ≥ δ2. These
bonuses satisfy βHH > βHL = βLL + η∆Q and βLH = βLL.T h i s i m p l i e s
2βHH −2ηQH > 2βHL−2ηQH = βHL+βLH −η(QH +QL)=2 βLL −2ηQL.
We moreover have from EA δ
1−δ (E(s) − π(H,H,β)+c)=βLL − ηQL.S o
EP is here
βHH − ηQH ≤
δ
1 − δ
[(1 − σ)∆q∆Q − c]+βLL − ηQL









[(1 − σ)∆q∆Q − c]
We see that δ2 is deﬁned as the minimal δ satisfying this inequality. This
completes the proof.
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